CrimeaWatch has completed the systematic review of every conclusion issued by Ukraine’s Public Integrity Council (PIC) from the body’s establishment through May 5, 2026. Alongside this analysis, we have published 40 new individual profiles of PIC members across the first, second, and third compositions, and 55 new organizational profiles documenting the PIC itself and the civic and professional bodies that delegated members to it. This is the largest single expansion of the CrimeaWatch register since the project began.
This work is not symbolic. It is the documentary backbone of an accountability project grounded in a single, uncomplicated legal premise: under Article 2 of the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine” (No. 1207-VII, 15 April 2014), the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol are inseparable parts of the territory of Ukraine. Russia’s purported jurisdiction over Crimea has no legal force in Ukraine. Treating it as if it did — in any official act, methodological document, or formal conclusion — is incompatible with Ukrainian law, regardless of the institution doing it and regardless of the political coalition under whose banner it is done.
The Conclusions Review#
Every PIC conclusion published in the Council’s official register through May 5, 2026 has been read, classified, and indexed. The review covers the full operating life of all three compositions, including conclusions issued under the December 16, 2020 Indicators for Determining Non-Compliance of Judges with Integrity and Professional Ethics Criteria — the methodology that explicitly equates a judge’s connections to Crimea with connections to the Russian Federation.
Of the conclusions reviewed, a substantial portion contain findings in which the PIC cited a judge’s or candidate’s Crimea-related ties — travel, property, professional activity, family connections — as a basis for an integrity finding. In each such case, the underlying premise is the same: that Crimea is, in operational terms, foreign territory under Russian control. That premise is not legally available to a Ukrainian institution. Issuing a formal conclusion that depends on it is itself the violation.
The 40 individual profiles published in this expansion document the members who participated in drafting, voting on, or applying that methodology. The 55 organizational profiles document the institutional infrastructure that produced and sustained them.
The 40 Individual Profiles#
These profiles cover members across all three compositions of the Council whose participation is documented in the conclusions, votes, or institutional acts on record. Each profile catalogues:
- Career history and current affiliations
- The composition or compositions of the PIC in which the individual served
- Specific institutional acts — votes, drafted conclusions, public statements — in which Crimea was treated as part of the Russian Federation
- Source links to official registers, asset declarations, court decisions, and organizational records
The individuals profiled are not anonymous bureaucrats. They are named, publicly identifiable figures within Ukraine’s judicial reform community — many of them visible spokespeople, NGO directors, attorneys, and journalists who have built professional reputations around the language of integrity, accountability, and the rule of law. Those reputations are exactly why their participation in formal acts that contradict Ukrainian constitutional law on the territorial question matters, and exactly why it is documented.
The 55 Organizational Profiles#
The decision to profile organizations alongside individuals reflects how delegation actually works. Members of the PIC do not arrive as private citizens. They are nominated by civic, professional, and legal organizations that vouch for them, fund them, employ them, and in many cases continue to do so during and after their PIC service. When a member casts a vote that operationalizes Russian jurisdiction over Crimea, the member’s delegating organization is not a bystander. It is the entity that placed that member in a position to cast that vote.
The 55 organizational profiles include:
- The Public Integrity Council itself as the institutional actor
- The civic and legal organizations that delegated representatives to the first, second, and third compositions
- Affiliated networks — funders, parent organizations, and successor bodies — through which the same individuals continue to operate
Each organizational profile documents the body’s stated mandate, leadership, funding sources where publicly disclosed, and the specific delegations or institutional positions through which it intersects with the PIC’s documented violations.
The Funding Paradox#
A pattern visible across the 55 organizational profiles deserves to be stated plainly. The Ukrainian civic and legal organizations that staffed the PIC, drafted its methodology, and produced its conclusions are densely interconnected. They share funders, share boards, share programmatic priorities, and share narratives. And they are, almost without exception, financed by Western donors: institutions of the European Union and its member states, the United Kingdom, the United States, and a recurring set of major private foundations.
This is the paradox at the centre of the network. Donors whose own governments have repeatedly affirmed the territorial integrity of Ukraine — at the United Nations General Assembly, in the G7, in the European Council, in their own bilateral statements — are sustaining a Ukrainian institutional ecosystem that, in formal procedural acts, treats Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. The donor governments say one thing in their foreign policy. The grantees they fund do the opposite in the formal acts of a Ukrainian quasi-judicial body.
We do not assume the donors are aware of the contradiction. The point of publishing the organizational profiles, with funding sources and delegations laid out, is to make awareness possible. A donor that reviews this register and continues to fund an organization whose representative voted for, drafted, or applied criteria equating Crimea with Russia is making an informed choice. So is a donor that reviews it and adjusts.
Why This Is Illegal, Not Merely Inadvisable#
The framing of “Crimea equivalence” as a procedural shortcut, a methodological convenience, or a pragmatic adaptation to wartime reality is the single most common defence offered for the practices documented here. It is not a legal defence. It is a rhetorical one.
The legal position is fixed. Ukrainian state bodies and bodies exercising public functions under Ukrainian law are bound by the Constitution and by Law No. 1207-VII. The Constitution defines the territory of Ukraine as indivisible and inviolable. Law No. 1207-VII establishes the legal regime of the temporarily occupied territories and, critically, prohibits any act that recognizes — explicitly or implicitly — the legitimacy of the occupying power’s jurisdiction. There is no methodological exception. There is no “for integrity-assessment purposes only” exception. There is no “everyone knows what we mean” exception.
A formal Ukrainian institutional act that treats Crimea travel as Russia travel, Crimea property as Russia property, or Crimea professional activity as Russia professional activity is an act in conflict with Ukrainian law. The PIC’s Indicators of December 16, 2020 are such an act. Every conclusion that applies them is another such act. Every organization that delegated a member who participated in adopting or applying them shares in the institutional responsibility for what its delegate did.
This is not about the personal politics, patriotism, or sincerity of any individual profiled on this site. It is about formal acts and the legal regime under which they were performed.
A Living Register#
The 40 individual profiles and 55 organizational profiles published in this expansion are a baseline, not an endpoint. Every profile on CrimeaWatch will continue to be revised as additional sources, documents, and institutional records become available. New violation instances will be added as further conclusions are reviewed and as additional acts come to light. New profiles will be added — both for individuals whose participation surfaces in the documentary record and for organizations whose institutional role becomes visible through that record.
The PIC is the first network we have mapped at this density. It will not be the last. The same documentary methodology — formal acts, named actors, institutional affiliations, funding flows — applies to other Ukrainian bodies in which Crimea-as-Russia has been quietly written into procedure. Those tracks are now opening.
What remains constant is the standard. CrimeaWatch documents formal institutional acts that, under Ukrainian constitutional law, may not lawfully be performed. It names the actors who performed them and the institutions that enabled them. It cites public sources. It does not soften the legal position to accommodate the political comfort of any actor on the register, regardless of that actor’s other affiliations or reputation.
Crimea is Ukraine. Acts that say otherwise — including procedural ones, including methodological ones, including ones performed by Western-funded reform NGOs — are the acts this site exists to document.
All profiles on this site are based on publicly available sources: official registers, asset declarations, court decisions, organizational records, donor disclosures, and media coverage. Source links are provided within each profile. Corrections supported by primary documentation are welcomed at the contact address listed on the site.