Ukrainian Centre for European Policy
⚠️ Violation Context
The Ukrainian Centre for European Policy was admitted by the High Qualification Commission of Judges to the assembly forming the third composition of the Public Integrity Council (decision No. 40/zp-23 of 27 July 2023) and delegated Eduard Myelkykh to that composition.
The PIC’s Indicators of Integrity, paragraph 1.5, treat a judge who “without urgent need visited the Russian Federation after the start of the armed aggression, temporarily occupied territories” as displaying support for aggression, placing occupied Ukrainian territory and the aggressor state in a single enumeration.
The Centre did not take part in the 2025 cycle and does not appear in HQCJ decision No. 138/zp-25.
This profile does not allege that the Ukrainian Centre for European Policy has made any statement recognizing Crimea as Russian territory. It has not.
Ukrainian Law Violations (applicable through institutional sponsorship):#
- Constitution of Ukraine, Article 2 — Territory of Ukraine is indivisible and inviolable.
- Constitution of Ukraine, Articles 73, 133–134 — Crimea is defined as an integral part of Ukraine.
- Law of Ukraine No. 1207-VII (2014) — Crimea is Ukrainian territory under temporary occupation, not foreign territory.
🏛️ About
Ukrainian Centre for European Policy#
An EU-integration think tank in the PIC’s third composition
The Ukrainian Centre for European Policy is a Kyiv think tank registered in October 2015 and focused on Ukraine’s European integration. It is documented on CrimeaWatch because in 2023 it was admitted to the assembly forming the Public Integrity Council and delegated Eduard Myelkykh to the Council’s third composition — the body whose Indicators of Integrity place visits to temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory in the same enumeration as visits to the Russian Federation.
Why This Profile Exists#
The Centre’s involvement is confined to one cycle, and this page records it as such. It applied in 2023, was vetted and admitted by decision No. 40/zp-23 of 27 July 2023, and nominated a delegate. It did not return in 2025.
The date still matters. July 2023 is two and a half years after the PIC unanimously adopted the revised Indicators containing paragraph 1.5, and well into the period in which the Council was issuing negative conclusions against judges over connections to occupied Crimea.
European Integration and the Non-Recognition Policy#
The Centre’s stated field gives this profile its specific weight. Ukraine’s European integration rests, among other things, on the European Union’s non-recognition policy: the EU and its member states do not recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea and treat the peninsula as occupied Ukrainian territory. That position has been the basis for successive sanctions regimes and is a fixed element of EU–Ukraine relations.
Paragraph 1.5 does not reproduce that distinction. It places “the Russian Federation after the start of the armed aggression” and “temporarily occupied territories” in one list, subject only to an exception for travel undertaken out of urgent need — an exception that presupposes the default rule rather than removing it.
A think tank whose subject is the alignment of Ukrainian practice with European standards supplied a member to the body applying that methodology, and has published no analysis of the divergence.
What This Profile Does Not Claim#
CrimeaWatch documents no statement by the Ukrainian Centre for European Policy recognizing Crimea as Russian territory, and none is alleged here.
Delegation is not a vote. The Centre’s delegate voted on the Council’s conclusions; the Centre did not. Its absence from the 2025 cycle is recorded above and is not treated as continued participation.
Response and Corrections#
The Ukrainian Centre for European Policy may submit a response or a correction request to [email protected]. Submissions are assessed against the underlying sources. Where a statement on this page is shown to be inaccurate, incomplete or out of date, the profile is amended and the correction is recorded.
CrimeaWatch does not publish responses verbatim and gives no undertaking to reproduce them. What a verified response changes is the content of this profile.
Summary#
The Ukrainian Centre for European Policy is documented on this site as a delegating organization of the Public Integrity Council’s third composition, admitted by HQCJ decision No. 40/zp-23 of 27 July 2023 and represented by Eduard Myelkykh.
A think tank whose work concerns Ukraine’s alignment with European standards — including the EU’s non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea — supplied a member to a body whose Indicators of Integrity treat travel to the occupied peninsula in the same terms as travel to the Russian Federation.
ℹ️ What Else We Know
The Delegation Record#
| PIC composition | Date | Delegate |
|---|---|---|
| Third | 14 August 2023 | Eduard Myelkykh |
| Fourth | 4 August 2025 | none — the organization did not participate |
Key Personnel Documented on This Site#
- Eduard Myelkykh — PIC member (second composition via Nova Kraina; third composition via the Ukrainian Centre for European Policy)
👥 Leadership
Executive Director; head of the organization in the state register since 28 September 2015
📅 Activity Timeline
Public organization 'Ukrainian Centre for European Policy' entered in the state register, EDRPOU 40064066, Kyiv
Decision No. 40/zp-23 recognizes the Centre as meeting the requirements for participation in the assembly forming the PIC
Delegates Eduard Myelkykh, previously a member of the second composition for Nova Kraina
The Centre does not appear in HQCJ decision No. 138/zp-25 forming the fourth composition
